INTRODUCTION
The event study is an important methodology in management research that enables the assessment of the value created by firm initiatives e.g. a firm's announcement of its e-commerce initiative, based on the responses of the capital market to the announcement. The presence of a positive significant risk-adjusted return in excess of the average stock market return, also termed the abnormal return (AR), associated with an event provides evidence that the event is expected to create positive future benefits for the firm. Since the early use of event study methodology in the information systems literature (Dos Santos, Peffers and Mauer, 1992) and, (Brynjolfsson and Yang, 1997 ) the use of this technique has recently surged. Researchers have employed it to examine the market value implications of new CIO positions (Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud, 2001) , IT investments (Hunter, 2001; Im, Dow and Grover, 2001 ), e-commerce initiatives (Subramani and Walden, 2001 ), creation of B2B emarketplaces (Chen and Siems, 2001 ), implementation of ERP systems (Ranganathan and Samarah, 2001) , IT failures (Bhardwaj and Kiel, 2001 ) and ecommerce sourcing (Agrawal, Kishore and Rao, 2002) .
Event studies are potentially very useful for IS researchers because they provide a unique window into firm outcomes related to complex processes occasioned by IT enabled initiatives. Event studies reveal the impact of firm initiatives on shareholder value, a metric that captures the firm's performance on a variety of dimensions such as sales, market share, operational efficiencies and profitability. Event studies also provide a commonly accepted benchmark to compare the outcomes of IT-enabled initiatives 1 across firms that may differ widely in terms of firm, industry and markets characteristics. Further, these comparisons can be made 1 IT-enabled initiatives are firm actions that are largely based on the capabilities of information technologies. Instances include the streamlining of activities using Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems and Supply Chain Management Systems (SCMS), introduction of e-commerce initiatives etc. The outcomes of such initiatives are closely linked to the ability of firms to employ the underlying information technologies in a manner that provides benefits. For an insightful articulation of features of net-enabled initiatives, see Straub et. al (2002) .
after adjusting for general market movements, the firm's risk profile and other factors that confound direct comparisons of firm-specific metrics.
The strength and the confidence placed in the results of event studies are sustained by periodic re-visiting of the fundamental assumptions made by the technique when they are applied to events in different disciplines. For instance, Yau, Ferry and Sugrue (Yau, Ferri and Sugrue, 1994) examined the assumptions by financial researchers that the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) was an appropriate source of data for announcements for event studies. Drawing a sample of convertible calls from the WSJ and other sources, they established the validity of the WSJ as a source of data for events. In the strategy literature Koh and Venkatraman (1991) , examined the correspondence of conclusions based on event study methodology of the value created by strategic alliances to managerial assessments of the outcomes of these initiatives. Similarly, Lubatkin and Shrieves (Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986 ) provide a detailed discussion of the contrasting perspectives in management strategy and finance and suggest recommendations for the application of event studies in the strategy literature. Each of these efforts aids the informed application of the methodology in a manner that is sensitive to the nuances of events and outcomes of interest to researchers in that discipline. In view of the popularity of the method in the IS literature, a critical evaluation of the application of event studies to study IT-enabled firm initiatives is timely and likely to provide useful insights.
In particular, this paper focuses on the choice of the event window in event studies involving novel information technologies. One of the key choices in such studies is the length of the event window employed to compute abnormal returns linked to events. The event window is the time span in which all relevant information needed to assess outcomes linked to the event being examined becomes available. Logically, the event window would begin on the event date, the date when the event is formally announced by the firm or other sources of information.
However, news about events often becomes public knowledge even before the event date as details about the impending event are leaked by insiders, spread as rumors or are inferred through other means by investors in capital markets. The event window employed in event studies therefore generally brackets the event date; beginning a few days before the event date and ending a few days later. Changes in the stock price within the period reflect investor response to the event 2 . The daily stock returns 3 within event windows are cumulated and used to compute the cumulative abnormal return linked to the event. (MacKinlay, 1997) Event studies typically use short time windows -ranging between one and ten days on either side of the event to compute abnormal returns. Event studies in the IS literature that use short event windows assume that investors in capital markets make a comprehensive assessment of the value created by events within a short time window after news of firms' plans becomes public. This is a questionable assumption in the context of IT-enabled events involving novel technologies 4 for several reasons. In general, payoffs to information technologies in general are hard to estimate in advance ). This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that novel information technologies such as e-commerce technologies may be deployed by firms to shape the strategic context and gain competitive advantages. For example, the e-commerce initiatives of many firms were based on the ability of the firm to transform the basis of creating value in their industries (Subramani and Walden, 2001) . The outcomes to firms of such events cannot be evaluated without consideration of competitive responses to these events -something that is not possible in most cases within short time windows (McGrath, Chen and Macmillan, 1998) . We therefore 2 This is true only if there are no other unrelated announcements by the firm within the event window. Firms with other announcements in the event window are usually eliminated from the data to minimize confounds from the effect of unrelated events. 3 Researchers can choose to use monthly stock returns but the availability of data and processing capacity has allowed widespread use of fine-grained data from daily returns. It is also feasible to use intra-day returns -the choice is determined by the nature of the event. The implications of this choice are discussed in Brown and Warner (1995) and McKinlay (1997) . 4 We highlight that our arguments relate to events involving the deployment of novel information technologies. The novelty of the effects of these technologies makes it difficult to determine if and how, these promising technologies are likely to create value. This ambiguity distinguishes events involving novel information technologies from other events involving IT such as the introduction of scanners in the retail industry (Hunter 2001) where event study assumptions are likely to be valid. Further, it is the novelty of the effects that distinguishes such events from others that have complex effects e.g. strategic alliances (Das et. al 1988) where investors can assess the outcomes based on prior firm experiences over the years in such events.
believe that the conventional assumption of rapid assessments of firm value related to events by the market needs re-evaluation, particularly when events are significantly enabled by novel information technologies.
Novel or radical technologies contain a high degree of new knowledge as compared to prior technologies and involve departures from existing practices for firms take advantage of them (Dewar and Dutton, 1986) .
The literature on innovation suggests that the introduction of such technologies is accompanied by considerable uncertainty. Prior investments may be rendered obsolete, adoption may involve high switching costs and firms often face steep learning curves in deploying and utilizing them (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy, 2002) . There is broad consensus by IS researchers that e-commerce technologies are novel and that have unique characteristics that set them apart from prior generations of information technologies (Straub, Hoffman, Weber and Steinfield, 2002) . Researchers in other disciplines have also similarly viewed the deployment of e-commerce technologies by firms as instances of radical technology adoption (Chandy, Prabhu and Antia, 2002; Srinivasan, et al., 2002) .
Prior studies of e-commerce events have used event data from one or two quarters with relatively modest sample sizes. The study by Subramani and Walden (2001) has the largest sample size with 251 events drawn from one quarter. This paper -employing a sample of over 1500 events (for the short-run analysis) and 345 events (for the analysis with a long event windows) from a two-year period contributes to the substantive understanding of the value of e-commerce initiatives in addition to making a methodological contribution to the conduct of event studies by IS researchers.
In this paper, we examine the implications of the length of event windows by analyzing data on ecommerce events in the period from 1999 to 2000 employing several short windows, as well as longer windows up to 1-year from the event. The dataset used for the analysis is the largest used to date in studying e-commerce events, comprising over 1500 e-commerce announcement over period when ecommerce initiatives were adopted by a broad cross section of firms. Further, this interval includes a period where market indices generally increased as well as the period when firm values in the market as a whole declined (March 24, 2001 onwards) . The stock price data used for the analysis also includes the period following the events of September 11, 2001, period of upheaval in the stock market when indicators of broad market movement registered a significant downward trend in market values.
The results suggest that abnormal returns to events in the 1999-2000 period using long event windows are different from those in ±1-day, ±5-day and ±10-day windows. The variation of abnormal returns in the short windows appear to be suspiciously similar to the fluctuations of market sentiments related to the Internet, indicating that extraneous factors may be more influential in determining these short term abnormal returns than is recognized by researchers. This provides preliminary evidence that abnormal returns over longer periods are likely to be more appropriate to infer value related to events involving novel information technologies than those calculated over short event windows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the event study method and highlights the assumptions underlying the choice of different time windows to determine the level of abnormal returns. Section 3 proposes hypotheses based on prior literature. Section 4 describes the data and coding procedures and Section 5 discusses the computation of abnormal returns over short and long event windows. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the implication of the results, the limitations of the study and some directions for future research.
THE EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY
Event study methodology draws on the efficient market hypothesis, which suggests that capital markets are efficient mechanisms that process all relevant information available about current and future benefits to determine the stock price of the firm (Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll, 1969) . The logic underlying the hypothesis is that investors in capital markets continuously evaluate all relevant information about firm activities to assess the impact of firm activities on both current performance and future firm performance.
When additional information about firm activities that might affect a firm's future earnings becomes publicly available, the stock price changes to reflect the changed assessment of the present value of the firm. Therefore, the pattern of changes to stock prices associated with news about firm activities becoming public reflects the implication of the news for future benefit streams to the firm. The strength of the method lies in the fact that it captures the overall assessment by a large number of investors of the discounted value of current and future firm benefits attributable to particular events (see (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997 )for a detailed review). The presence of a positive significant risk-adjusted return in excess of the average stock market return, also termed the abnormal return (AR), associated with events or news about firm initiatives provides evidence that the event creates current and future benefits for firms. Researchers have employed event study methodology to infer the implications of a wide variety of events such as takeover bids, earnings announcements, name changes, celebrity endorsements, affirmative action awards, discrimination suits and implementation of TQM initiatives, winning of quality awards (see Subramani and Walden 2001 and McWilliams and Siegel 1997 for a list of event studies in the literature).
But how rapidly do capital markets adjust stock prices in response to new information? The expectation is that in efficient markets, all the relevant information is immediately available to all parties and price adjustments occurs nearly instantaneously or within a very short period such as a few hours or at most, a few days. However, there is increasing evidence in the accounting and finance literature that though capital markets are efficient in processing the information that is available; the attribution of value to a specific event can be constrained by the unavailability of relevant information to assess future benefit streams (Bernard and Thomas, 1990) . The adjustment of the stock price linked to a particular event is thus viewed as an ongoing process. This adjustment is determined by the characteristics of the event and the availability of relevant information on the impact of the event on future prospects for the firm. In the case of earnings announcements by firms, abnormal returns are observed several months after the original announcement -a phenomenon termed the post-earnings-announcement drift (Bernard and Thomas, 1989) . When capital markets cannot make instantaneous stock price adjustments in response to information about an event, the time taken by capital markets to arrive at an assessment of the implications of events depends upon the time interval in which relevant information about benefits created by the event becomes available (Chen, Lin and Sauer, 1997; Jennings and Starks, 1985) . The duration of ongoing adjustments in the valuation of stock prices is also linked to the information processing demands involved in the assessment of benefits (Chen, et al., 1997) . This important conceptual development thus links the speed of price adjustments to both the quality and the availability of information needed to make reliable outcome assessments and the ability to make reliable judgments about future benefit streams 5 (Chen, et al., 1997) . Overall, these arguments suggest that the length of the event window employed in event studies needs to be decided on a case-to-case basis, based on the characteristics of events and the time span over which relevant information to make reliable judgments becomes available; a conclusion also suggested by the empirical results of Brown, Lockwood and Lummer (Brown, Lockwood and Lummer, 1985) .
These arguments suggest that short time windows in event studies are appropriate where all the relevant information to assess future benefit streams linked to the event is readily available. In such cases, price adjustments to stocks of firms linked to events occur within a very short period and these are captured by the abnormal returns observed within the short event windows. Markets are expected to evaluate the implications of discrete events such as successful takeover bids, (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989 ) celebrity endorsement, (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995) and strategic alliances (Das, Sen and Sengupta, 1998 ) within a few days, or even hours of the information becoming public. Researchers have therefore examined the abnormal returns to such events within short event windows -typically one day on either side of the announcement and sometimes five or ten days bracketing the date of the announcement.
On the other hand, for events such as the implementation of Total Quality Management (TQM) programs, relevant information to assess outcomes is available only over several years and this is the period in which capital markets can evaluate the value created to the firm (Easton and Jarrell 1998) . The event windows employed in studies examining this phenomenon are therefore as long as five years from the date of the announcement of TQM programs. (Easton and Jarrell, 1998; Hendricks and Singhal, 1996) In the IS literature, prior studies examining abnormal returns to IT investments (Dos Santos, et al., 1992; Im, et al., 2001) and IT investments in e-commerce technologies (Subramani and Walden, 2001 ) (Chen and Siems, 2001; Richardson, Saunders and Zmud, 2001 ) have employed short event windows ranging from one to ten days. However, it is not clear if the length of the event window in these studies was a deliberate choice based on a careful consideration of the time taken by markets to evaluate the implications of events or if the researchers, justifiably, followed the standard practice in the event study literature of employing short event windows. The assumption that markets can assess the value created by initiatives involving novel information technologies within short time windows of between one and ten days of the announcement is problematic when these events involve novel information technologies for several reasons.
First, novel information technologies such as e-commerce technologies represent radical departures from prior technologies (Kauffman and Walden, 2001; Srinivasan, et al., 2002) and the ways in which they deliver value and the consequent changes to firms, markets and the economics of production, pricing and distribution of goods are novel to both firms and to investors. In general, Chandy, Prabhu and Antia (Chandy, et al., 2002) point out that there are often divergent expectations regarding the effects of adopting radical innovations on existing products. While some may believe that adopting these innovations would enhance sales of existing products and reinforce existing firm resources, others may believe that the new product would make prior products obsolete and thus diminish the value of current firm resources. A third possibility is that firms and their resources are unlikely to be affected significantly in any way. A similar argument with respect to e-commerce technologies is suggested by Straub et. al 
who indicate that "we concur … that Internet commerce represents the beginnings of a second Industrial Revolution …it is important to recognize that the Web enables novel
forms of business that were simply not practical before, or even, possible..". In describing the uniqueness of e-commerce technologies, they suggest that "These characteristics combine to create a medium that is substantially different from the sum of its parts, and in some cases, continues to confound managers seeking ways to capitalize on its uniqueness" (Straub, et al., 2002 ) (page 13). Clearly, this uncertainty, in conjunction with the inherent difficulty of assessing payoffs to information technologies makes it very difficult for investors to determine the appropriate metrics to judge the value to firms from these novel technologies within a few days of the event.
Second, the adoption of novel information technologies by firms is a complex process 6 and payoffs from such initiatives often involves an array of complementary activities such as changes to operating processes, training for personnel and participatory labor practices. (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj and Konsynski, 1999; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 1998; Hitt and Brynjolfsson, 1996) In such situations, a full assessment of their value cannot be made without information on the complementary changes made by the firm -changes that may take several months to make after the date of the event. Accurate judgments of the value derived from information technologies is possibly only through a consideration of these issues. For instance, in the early 1980s, many U.S. firms did not coordinate investments in flexible manufacturing systems with changes to their product mix and increased training for their employees. Further, the novel manufacturing technologies were often used for high-volume, low variety production by employees with relatively low levels of skill 7 . The combination of these choices created a misfit between manufacturing and product strategies, leading to a decline rather than the increase in performance expected with investments in these technologies (Jaikumar, 1986) . Clearly, an assessment of the ability of firms to benefit from novel technologies soon after their introduction is incomplete because of the lack of information on the variety of complementary investments, most of which are evident only subsequent to technology introduction.
Third, there is a substantial learning curve associated with new information technologies and the value created is hard to assess based on firm experiences with prior technologies .
6 Some of these arguments apply to a variety of information technologies but we discuss them here in the context of novel information technologies. 7 The changes required to make the technologies pay off became evident through experience gained from widespread technology deployment (Jaikumar, 1986) .
With novel technologies such as those related to e-commerce, there is often little guidance available to firms with respect to strategies to apply, create and appropriate value (Srinivasan, et al., 2002) . Many popular attempts to guide ecommerce deployments (Kaplan and Sawhney, 2000; Sawhney and Acer, 2000) ( Christensen and Tedlow, 2000; Slywotzky, 2000; Venkatraman, 2000) provided advice based on anecdotal evidence that in hindsight, were of dubious value as several of the firms hailed as exemplars are currently either struggling or currently out of business. Firms implementing ecommerce technologies had consequently had to evolve and refined their strategies in the course of ongoing execution, a feature typical of novel technologies (Chandy, et al., 2002) .
Fourth, information technologies are often important components of competitive strategies of firms and the value created by them is often contingent on competitors' responses to firm actions (McGrath, et al., 1998) . The ability of firms to be able to retain a proportion of the value created through technology enabled strategies -rather than have them dissipated through price competition can often not be assessed in advance (Porter, 2001) . For instance, the benefits to Netflicks, a successful startup firm offering DVD rentals over the web, from their web based strategies was radically revised after Blockbuster, the dominant conventional video rental firm, announced that it was piloting a similar service in some of their markets (Tedeschi, 2002) .
Finally, there is often a considerable positive bias accompanying novel technologies 8 , firms may therefore be tempted to make announcements to cater to stockholder expectations of favorable firm attributes such as a forward-looking, willing-to-innovate management. In the short term, it is therefore very difficult for investors to distinguish between announcements representing genuine attempts by firms to deploy novel technologies from symbolic moves by managers of firms (Westphal and Zajac, 1998) . However, the difference between announcements that are posturing signals and substantive moves that are backed by serious attempts to 8 Cusumano and Yoffie (Cusumano and Yoffie, 1998 )provide a detailed account of the excitement surrounding ecommerce technologies in the early period of their development. implement them become evident to investors over time, allowing the appropriate assessment of firm value linked to announcements.
Thus, there is considerable face validity therefore to the argument that it is unrealistic to expect capital markets to make appropriate assessments of the value of initiatives involving novel information technologies in the short term (between one and ten days of the event) because they are limited by the lack of quality information and the availability of relevant information to make informed judgments.
Overall, we suggest that examining the abnormal returns in long event windows is necessary to accurately reflect assessments of the overall value created by events involving novel information technologies. In particular, for novel technologies that provide both operational benefits as well as strategic benefits to firms, reliable assessments of firm value are possible over longer periods as relevant information becomes available.
For instance, in the case of ecommerce announcements, information on the ability of firms to make complementary change, retrain employees, effect changes to their business processes and encourage channel partners to make corresponding changes to exploit the capabilities of these technologies are revealed over several quarters after the initial event date. Abnormal returns computed over longer windows are therefore likely to be more informative indicators of the value created by firm initiatives.
We therefore examine abnormal returns to electronic commerce initiatives of firms in two different sets of event windows -a set of short windows between one and five days around the event and a set of longer event windows -six months, nine months and one year from the date of the event. We expect that a comparison of the pattern of ARs in short windows and in the longer windows is likely to provide more information on the manner in which capital markets assess the value of IT enabled initiatives by firms in the different time frames. The results are also likely to help guide the choice of the length of windows to be employed for event studies examining responses to events involving novel information technologies.
PAYOFFS FROM E COMMERCE INITIATIVES
Prior research suggests that e-commerce initiatives create expectations of future benefit streams for firms and cause investors to revise upward, the value of the firm's stock (Subramani and Walden 2001, Chen and Siems 2001) . This is thus likely to be reflected in a positive cumulative abnormal return to firms making announcements relating to their e-commerce initiatives. This therefore leads to the hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 1: The announcements of EC initiatives by firms are associated with positive abnormal returns. Subramani and Walden (2001) , (hereafter referred to as SW) examine a variety of firm specific and initiative specific contingencies influencing the returns to firms from e-commerce initiatives: the nature of the firm (net firm vs. conventional firm), the nature of the initiative (B2B vs. B2B) and the type of goods involved (digital vs. tangible). For each of these categories, we propose a hypothesis consistent with the results of SW. In addition, we also examine the association between abnormal returns and two variables drawn from strategy research -the character of the ecommerce strategy with respect to the current strategies of the firm (whether it is incremental or transformational) and the governance structure of the initiative (whether it is carried out unilaterally by the firm or whether it was carried out jointly with another firm.
FACTORS INFLUENCING ABNORMAL RETURNS
Net firms and Conventional firms: SW examined the returns related to announcements by net and conventional firms and found the announcements of both types of firms associated with abnormal returns.
Their results indicate that the abnormal returns for net firms are larger in magnitude than those for conventional firms but the differences are not significant. Consistent with this result, we suggest that:
Hypothesis 2: There are positive abnormal returns associated with initiatives by conventional firms and by net firms; the abnormal returns to the two types of firms are similar.
Nature of Initiative -B2B and B2C: There are significant abnormal returns to both B2B and B2C initiatives and the returns associated with B2C initiatives are larger than those associated with B2B initiatives SW. We therefore hypothesize that: Governance Structure of Initiative -Unilateral, Joint: Chen and Siems (2001) , in their examination of returns to a small set of 39 e-commerce initiatives related to emarketplaces found that initiatives with differing governance structures varied in the level of abnormal returns. The returns to initiatives carried out unilaterally by firms were lower than the returns to initiatives involving joint action by multiple firms. Chen and Siems (2001) suggest that this difference reflects the superior ability to create value by accessing expertise external to the firm. However, drawing general conclusions from these results is problematic because of the small sample size and the idiosyncratic sample of announcements examined. It is also likely that contracting difficulties 9 can lead to opportunism and incentive distortions and prevent optimal levels of investments when initiatives involve multiple parties (Bakos and Brynjyolfsson, 1993b) leading to the returns to unilateral initiatives to potentially exceed those to joint initiatives. It is not clear if the disadvantages of incentive misalignment offset the benefits from accessing expertise external to the firm. We hypothesize that there are likely to be positive abnormal returns to both types of initiatives: Link to current strategy -Transformational vs. Incremental: The nature of the e-commerce initiative -whether it is incremental or whether it is transformational with respect to the firm's strategy at the time of the announcement influences abnormal returns is an important factor influencing outcomes (Venkatraman, 2000) . An incremental initiative reflects the execution or an extension of the current strategy by utilizing ecommerce technologies. In contrast, transformational initiatives are those that reflect a firm's attempt to radically alter its strategy by leveraging e-commerce technologies-to position themselves favorably, or to develop a new niche by radically altering processes, practices and business models (Venkatraman 2000) .
These strategies also parallel the distinction made between exploitation: the elaboration of old certainties and exploration as opposed to the pursuit of new possibilities (March, 1991) page 71. Incremental initiatives have more certain payoffs while transformational initiatives are more risky but the payoffs are considerably higher (Venkatraman 2000 , March 1991 ). Whether initiatives with lower, more certain benefits are viewed as creating more value than those with higher but more uncertain outcomes is an empirical issue. We therefore suggest that:
Hypothesis 6: There are positive abnormal returns associated with the announcements of both incremental and transformational initiatives by firms; the abnormal returns to incremental and transformational initiatives are similar.
DATA
We define the event as a public announcement of a firm's e-commerce initiative in the media. We collected the data from a full text search of company announcements related to e-commerce in the period between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2000, using two leading news sources: PR Newswire, and Business Wire. Following SW, we identify announcements containing the words launch or announce within the same sentence as the words online or commerce, and .com and NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX. Overall, from the set of 4744 announcements derived from the text search, we identified 2097 as relating to e-commerce events after eliminating irrelevant events such as marketing announcements, customer acquisitions, seasonal promotions, website redesign etc. As suggested by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) , we took steps to eliminate confounding effects from extraneous occurrences by dropping events linked to firms that also announced senior management changes, earnings announcements, mergers, and acquisitions within ten days of the ecommerce announcement. We also eliminated events relating to privately held firms and to new listings on stock exchanges that did not have a trading history of 120 days before the event to be included in the analysis. Events related to stocks with an average price of less than $1 were dropped, as price changes in these stocks tend to be unrepresentative of the broader market. We also dropped events related to stocks where the average daily traded volume in the period was less than 50,000 shares. Eliminating data from lowpriced or inactive stocks provides a data set with stocks that have a sufficient following and broad enough investor interest to be fairly priced before the announcement (Subramani and Walden 2001) . A small number of firms were dropped because of gaps in the data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT. The final sample retained for analysis contained 1506 announcements.
CODING
The laborious and detail oriented task of coding the announcements by a careful analysis of the text of the announcement was performed over several months by two coders -one of the authors and a graduate student. The coders worked through multiple sets of practice announcements to become familiar with the coding scheme. Once the reliability of the coding of practice data by the two coders was sufficiently high, they commenced working independently to code announcements in the dataset. The coding of each announcement, on average, took between 5-10 minutes. Codes assigned by the two coders were matched programmatically in blocks of 100-300 announcements. Once the codes were matched and discrepancies highlighted, coders took turns in resolving the differences. In this phase, coders reexamined the announcement text and chose to either change the original coding to be consistent with that of the other coder or provide a justification to support their original coding. The other coder then examined the remaining discrepancies and could choose to either provide a justification for his own coding or change his coding based on a review of the announcement text as well as the justification of the other coder for the coding. The few events where disagreements persisted after this two-step process were resolved through discussions in face-to-face meetings. The overall level of inter-coder agreement in the set of over 63,000
individual coding decisions was approximately 85%. The details of the coding scheme are included in Appendix-2. Table 1 indicates the distribution of events among the categories and illustrative examples of each. 
METHODOLOGY SHORT EVENT WINDOWS
The methodological details of the short run event study are well documented in the literature (Chatterjee, et al., 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Subramani and Walden, 2001) . Consistent with the prior examination of e-commerce events in SW, we estimated a market model for each individual firm using 120 trading days of returns regressed against the S&P 500 and used this to compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with e-commerce announcements within 1-day and 5-day time windows on either side of the event.
LONG EVENT WINDOW
Market reactions over long windows are assessed by computing the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). The properties of BHAR and tests to determine its significance are available from prior work (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Cowan and Sergeant, 2001; Kothari and Warner, 1997) . The strength of the BHAR is that it captures investor experience accurately. For instance, a 1-year BHAR is essentially the difference in the returns of the stock if it were bought on the day before the announcement date, held for a year and the return compared to market returns in the same period. The BHAR is thus computed as the difference between the compounded returns of the firm and of a benchmark market index 10 over a year:
(1)
In our sample of 1506 events, 1085 firms occurred more than once because they had made multiple announcements related to e-commerce events in the period between 1999 and 2000. To eliminate confounds and bias due to overlapping of the one year buy and hold periods for multiple announcements by the same firm, we retained only firms that made one announcement in the period. This is consistent with the procedures adopted in prior research to create a subset of firms with 'clean data' (Choi and Philippatos, 1983) .
Some firms in the sample also dropped out when the stocks stopped being traded within the one year window after the event for various reasons e.g. firms being acquired, being taken private, going out of business etc..
The dataset for the one-year BHAR analysis thus comprised 345 firms.
10 To be consistent in the comparison of short and long term returns, we chose the S&P 500 as the market benchmark. Table 2 reports the basic demographics of the sample used for the analysis of short run and the long run returns -the average stock prices of firms in the sample and the average trading volumes. The short run analyses (using ±1-day, ±5-day and ±10-day windows) included firms in the sample for which data were available for 120 trading days before the event. For the long run analyses (1-year window), we required firms to have data available for one trading day prior to the event and for one year after the event. Table 2 provides the details of the full set of 1506 events used for short run analyses and the subset of 345 events used for long run analyses. Table 3 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) linked to e-commerce events observed in different short windows around the event date. The table presents the CARs linked to the overall set of firms (row 1) as well as for the different types of events for 1-day, 5-day and 10-day windows around the event date. Table 3 also presents the magnitude and the significance of the differences in CARs between different event types (e.g. conventional firms vs. net firms).
DATA DEMOGRAPHICS

RESULTS
SHORT EVENT WINDOWS
The results indicate that the magnitudes of average abnormal returns for firms (Table 3 , row 1) linked to ecommerce events are 0.44% over the 1-day window, 0.71% over the 5-day window and -1.13% over the 10 day window. None of these are significantly different from zero.
In the 1-day window, significant positive CARs are associated with events related to conventional firms However, in the 5-day window, none of the significant results in the 1-day window is sustained and a different set of subgroups is associated with significant returns. Significant CARs are associated with Net firms (1.99%, t=1.99, p<.05), B2C initiatives (1.45%, t=2.14, p<.05) and incremental initiatives (8.08%, t=6.15, p<.01). The difference between CARs related to B2B and B2C (-2.01, t=1.75, p<.10) as well as the difference between transformational and incremental initiatives (-6.54, t=1.94, p<.10 ) are significant at the .01 level.
In the 10-day window, neither the subgroups nor the differences between them are associated with significant CARs. The pattern of results indicates that returns observed in 1-day, 5-day and 10-day time windows are different with little discernable correspondence among them.
LONG EVENT WINDOW
As the data spans two years (1999) (2000) , we carried out analyses of BHARs over several long event windows -6-months, 9-months and 1-year from the event date. These analyses were carried out using a smaller subsample of 345 firms that had made only one announcement in the 1-year time window to eliminate the bias from other e-commerce announcements by the firm in the 1-year time window. The Buy and Hold abnormal returns for the different windows are in Table 4 .
Overall, the results suggest a fair degree of correspondence in the results across the three long event windows. The correspondence in the returns in these windows reflects the ability of investors to make consistent judgments based on superior information. Overall, the BHARs linked to ecommerce announcements by firms are consistently positive and significant in all 3 windows. In all of the windows, the e-commerce initiatives by conventional firms, those related to B2B initiatives and those related to incremental strategies are positive and significant. E-commerce initiatives involving tangible goods are significant in the 6-month and 1-year windows. Based on our arguments earlier, we believe that the CARs in the 1-year window reflect the best estimate of informed investor expectations of firm value created by e-commerce initiatives.
The results indicate that in the 1-year window, for the initiatives of the 345 firms in the sample, ecommerce announcements are related to significant Buy and Hold abnormal returns (9.51%, t=2.11, p<.05).
In particular, BHARs are positive and significant for conventional firms (11.38%, t=2.37, p<.05), B2B initiatives (20.55%, t=2.53, p<.01), initiatives involving tangible goods (13.39%, t=2.53, p<.01) and incremental initiatives (11.43%, t=2.12, p<.05).
The abnormal returns based on the long event windows are quite different from those based on short windows and lead to different conclusions regarding the value of e-commerce events. So which one of these sets of results is more reliably indicative of the value created by e-commerce events for firms? It is very difficult to answer this question without the benefit of greater hindsight. However, of the two sets of windows we examine, we believe that the results of longer windows are more reliable based on the logic that investors would be able to make more appropriate judgments of value based on information on the implementation of the e-commerce initiative by firms over the course of six, nine or twelve months than within one, five or ten days of the event. suggesting that the results of event studies performed in different time intervals (using one day event windows) would have produced quite different results, depending on the time period examined.
The CARS related to e-commerce initiatives in shorter time periods within from 1999-2000 are provided in Table 5 . This indicates that the CARS differ considerably across different quarters and that within each 11 Details of the kernel estimation technique are provided in quarter, the CARs based on 1-day windows and 5-day windows are different. In Q2 1999, the CARs for the 1-day event window are -1.1 percent while those in the 5-day window are 12.9 percent. To examine if these results are skewed by announcements being bunched in specific periods, we examine the distribution of e-commerce announcements. Figure 2 indicates the distribution of announcements and the pattern of 1-day CARs in the two-year period. It is interesting to note that that the number of announcements in any of the periods considered in Table-5 is not significantly correlated to either the CAR in that period (p-value = 0.3) or to CARs in the prior period (p = 0.4). The cyclicality of the CARS associated with e-commerce events in different time periods (Table 5) suggests the likelihood that the assessments of the value of the events may be driven by factors other than the information contained in announcements. To examine this possibility, we examined the variation in the first difference of the AMEX Internet Index over the same period and compared it to the variation in CARs.
Figure 2 presents the 50 day moving average of AMEX Internet index for the period superimposed on the fluctuations in CARs computed on 1-day windows associated with e-commerce events. Recall that the CARs incorporate an adjustment for a market index (in our case, the S&P 500). The correspondence between the two curves suggests that CARs over short event windows strongly reflect the current sentiment towards
Internet stocks rather than firm-specific information content in announcements. In periods when the Internet index decreases, CARS are depressed and in periods when the index is rising, CARS rise as well.
Overall, these results suggest that short term event windows are susceptible to 'period effects', biasing conclusions about the values attributable to events.
Our results provide preliminary evidence to support the logic that market adjustments regarding the value of e-commerce announcements occur over longer periods and that abnormal returns calculated over short event windows in event studies are likely to be biased by extraneous influences. Clearly, we need studies examining the phenomenon over longer periods to examine if abnormal returns over 1-year windows are similarly susceptible to spurious influences. Recently, researchers have argued for a more careful consideration of the temporal dimension and suggested that it should be explicitly incorporated in theorizing (Zaheer, Zaheer and Albert, 1999) . Our results provide evidence supporting these arguments and indicate that the period-effect is an important factor in the short term assessments of the value created by them for firms by capital markets. Given that an intention of the event study methodology is to capture the value implications of managerial actions, longer event windows are therefore the more appropriate choice when events involve information technologies.
Therefore, of the two sets of results one based on short event windows and the results based on three long windows, we suggest that the results of the 1-year window are likely to be reliable assessments of the value associated with e-commerce events. We therefore examine support for the hypotheses using the results of the 1-year event window.
SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESES 12
Overall, the results of the analysis using 1-year windows (Table 4) suggest that e-commerce initiatives are associated with significant abnormal returns (BHAR= 9.51%, t=2.11, p<.05), suggesting support for H1.
The initiatives of conventional firms are associated with significant abnormal returns (11.38%, t=2.37, p<.05) as hypothesized. The abnormal returns for initiatives of net firms are negative but not significantly different from zero (BHAR = -4.35%, t=-0.25, ns). The difference in abnormal returns between the two subgroups is not significant (diff = 15.75, t=1.08, ns). These results suggest that H2 is only partially supported.
B2B initiatives are associated with significant abnormal returns (BHAR=20.55%, t=2.53, p<.05) as hypothesized. However, the returns associated with B2C initiatives are positive but not significant (BHAR = 1.51%, t=0.30, ns). Contrary to the hypothesized direction, the returns to B2B initiatives are higher than those to B2C initiatives and this difference is significant (diff = 19.04, t=2.09, p<.05) . These suggest that H3 is partially supported.
Initiatives involving tangible goods are associated with significant abnormal returns (BHAR=13.39%, t=2.17, p<.05) as hypothesized. The returns associated with initiatives involving digital goods are positive but not significant (BHAR = 5.42%, t=0.82, ns) . The returns associated with tangible goods are higher than those to digital goods as hypothesized but the difference is not significant (diff = 7.98, t=0.88, ns) . H4 is thus only partially supported.
The abnormal returns associated with unilateral initiatives as well as those to initiatives undertaken jointly by firms are positive but neither of the returns is significant. Further, the difference between them is not significant. H5 is thus not supported.
The abnormal returns associated with incremental initiatives are positive and significant (BHAR = 11.43%, t=2.12, p<.05) while those associated with transformational initiatives are positive but not significant (BHAR = 3.14%, t=0.40, ns) . The difference between the two is also not significant. H6 is thus partially supported.
The overall result of this study is consistent with that of Subramani and Walden (2001) -that e-commerce initiatives create significant value for firms. However, while a wide range of initiative characteristics were indicated as being significant in the SW study, only a subset of these are significant when examined over a longer period 13 . In particular, the initiatives of conventional firms, those that were B2B, initiatives involving tangible goods and initiatives that were incremental were all associated with significant BHARs.
However, what is surprising is the level of correspondence between the magnitudes of some of the CARs reported by SW in Q4, 1998 and the significant BHARs in our study using data over a two year period (1999 to 2000). For instance, SW found the CARs linked to e-commerce events of 7.5% and 16.2% for 5-day and 10-day windows -the BHARs observed across all firms in this study is 9.51%. The CARs related to conventional firms were 4.9 and 14% while the BHARS we found are 11.38%. The CARs related to initiatives involving B2B initiatives are 5.2% and 12.8%, the BHARS we found are 20.55%. Similarly, the CARs related to tangible goods reported by SW are 9.4% and 23.4%, the BHARs we found are 13.39%.
These results provide interesting insights on firm benefits from e-commerce initiatives. Overall, ecommerce initiatives are associated with significant abnormal returns -suggesting that e-commerce technologies are potential sources of advantage for firms. Conventional firms are recognized as facing significant hurdles in adapting their processes to take advantage of e-commerce technologies -they are constrained in their utilization of the potential of e-commerce technologies by their prior resource commitments to traditional ways of doing business (Subramani and Walden, 2001 ). This disadvantage is sometimes termed the incumbents' curse (Chandy and Tellis, 2000) . Our results provide evidence based on two years of data and a 1-year long event window that conventional firms are able to leverage their resources such as the understanding of products, markets and their channel relationships to benefit from the opportunities created by e-commerce technologies. Further, net firms -startups whose basis of advantage is their superior understanding of technologies do not fare as well as conventional firms. Notwithstanding arguments suggesting that the clockspeed imposed by ecommerce technologies favor the fluid organizational arrangements of net firms rather than the more structured operations of conventional firms (Yoffie and Cusumano, 1999) , startups do not fare as well as conventional firms.
The results that incremental initiatives are associated with significant abnormal returns of 11.43% (while abnormal returns to transformational initiatives are not) are interesting as they suggest that e-commerce technologies are most useful in being able to extend the scope of the deployment of firm resources (establishing new ways of reaching existing customers, more efficient ways of executing existing processes) rather than creating opportunities for novel and hitherto unexplored ways of creating value. This suggests that prognostications of e-commerce technologies radically transforming the business landscape overstate the case and that the effects are more in line with the tempered views of incremental change (Porter, 2001) . This is consistent with the result that B2B initiatives are associated with abnormal returns (while B2C initiatives are not) and that the returns to B2B initiatives are significantly higher than those to B2C initiatives. This perhaps -indicates that a bulk of the use of e-commerce technologies in B2B contexts reflects the streamlining of existing interorganizational interactions using the new technologies rather than the use of the technologies to create novel channels to customers. This is an issue that needs further examination. Finally, that initiatives involving tangible goods are associated with abnormal returns (while those to digital goods are not) is interesting. This indicates despite near-zero marginal production costs for digital goods and the considerable ease with which they can be delivered using e-commerce technologies, these advantage continue to be in the realm of potential rather than being active sources of firm value in the two year period we examined. These results are consistent with the views in a recent report on online music sales: "the road to paradise is proving to be more like an intellectual property labyrinth paved with administrative quicksand" (Harmon, 2002) . Finally, incremental rather than transformational ecommerce initiatives were associated with significant CARs, indicating that e-commerce technologies have created value as part of incremental firm initiatives rather than as means for the creation and delivery of novel products and services.
LIMITATIONS
The results of this study need to be interpreted with caution in view of its limitations. Some of these limitations offer opportunities for further research. Results based on long event windows are susceptible to the confounding effects of extraneous events occurring in the window, unrelated to the event being examined (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) . The study of the long-term abnormal returns is based on a subsample of 345 firms that had made no further e-commerce announcements in the 1-year window following the initial announcement. The requirement of 'clean' data may have resulted in a non-representative sample of firms as those that were excluded by the screening criterion are likely to have been relatively more active in announcing e-commerce initiatives. Further, a disproportionately large number of net firms were eliminated by the requirement that there be at least one year's worth of stock price data after the event date. It is likely that this weeded out firms that failed in the interim period, thus biasing the results to reflect those of the survivors rather than the overall set of firms announcing e-commerce events. Further, the longest window we use is the 1-year event window -largely because of limitations on the availability of data. The analysis of the 1-year window on events from 1999-2000 used data on stock returns till December 2001 that became available on CRSP in April 2002. As more data becomes available with time, future research using longer time windows would provide a greater understanding of the important issue of the length of the event window to be used to assess returns related to e-commerce initiatives.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We find that there are noticeable differences in investor reactions to e-commerce initiatives within short event windows (1-day, 5-day and 10-days around the event date). Further, the results based on these short windows are different from those in longer windows -six months, nine months and one year around the event date. Of the different sets of results, those in the longer windows are consistent and we use the results of the one-year window to draw substantive conclusions about the value created for firms in e-commerce initiatives.
We suggest that the differences between the different short windows reflect the difficulty of estimating benefit streams to firms based on information available at the time of the announcement or within a few days of the announcement. Prior research suggests that the realization of benefits by firms from initiatives involving novel information technologies by firms is a complex process (Chandy, et al., 2002 ) that is influenced by a variety of complementary firm actions as well as the actions of competing firms and partners in the firms' value chain (Bakos and Brynjyolfsson, 1993a; El Sawy, Malhotra, Gosain and Young, 1999) . Since information on these important events bearing on the value created by the focal event becomes available only over time -we suggest that the abnormal returns calculated over the 1-year period are more reliable indicators of the value of e-commerce initiatives.
We also find that short run CARs fluctuate considerably for ecommerce events in concert with a broader Internet index, suggesting short run estimates by investors in capital markets reflect market sentiment regarding the Internet sector rather than the value implications of the information content of firm announcements. This is logical, considering that investors are likely to use whatever proxies are available to infer value when more reliable data are not forthcoming (Rajgopal, Venkatachalam and Kotha, 2002) .
The results have implications for the length of the event window used by IS researchers to compute abnormal returns in events involving novel information technologies. The results highlight that the length of the event window needs to be determined by a consideration of the time period in which relevant information becomes available to assess outcomes linked to such events. While this is certainly not a novel or surprising revelation, this suggests the need for a context-sensitive decision on the length of the event window. The convention of using short event windows relies on the availability of relevant information and the ability of investors to rapidly process information. Short windows are therefore appropriate for discrete events, such as dividend announcements that are events of interest in the accounting literature (Brown, et al., 1985; Brown, 1980) . However, short windows are likely to be inappropriate in the context of novel information technologies where the relevant information is not immediately available and the information processing demands to judge benefit streams linked to events are greater. The appropriate length of window to be employed needs to be informed by researchers' judgment regarding the length of time within which relevant information regarding the value associated with the event becomes available. We suggest that this is an issue that needs to be informed by prior theory and researchers should explicitly justify the choice of the event window in presenting the results of their results.
This study used a 1-year time window to infer the e-commerce events based on the logic that an estimate of the value would be possible only after investors have information on the ability of firms to make complementary investments, to persuade channel partners to make similar investments and to reformulate their strategies in the light of competitive responses. Such information is likely to be available within a year of the original event, justifying the use of a 1-year event window to infer abnormal returns. The results suggest that firms making e-commerce announcements are associated with significant Buy and Hold abnormal returns of 9.51% over a 1-year period. The e-commerce initiatives of conventional firms are associated with BHARs of 11.38%, B2B initiatives with BHARs of 20.5%, initiatives involving tangible goods with 13.38% and incremental initiatives are associated with BHARs of 11.43%. The magnitudes of these returns, adjusted with a market index, are at the higher end of the distribution of returns observed in prior event studies (see Subramani and Walden 2001 for a listing of the abnormal returns), suggesting that e-commerce technologies are powerful means for firms to create value for shareholders. 
BODY:
Select Comfort Corporation (Nasdaq: AIRB) today announced the formation of an e-commerce subsidiary, to be called selectcomfort.com. The company's online ordering capabilities will open a new distribution channel for its line of adjustable-firmness air beds. Select Comfort is the first major mattress manufacturer to sell its products online.
The company also announced that Renee Christensen has been named vice president of e-commerce for the parent company. Christensen, formerly with online services at U.S. Bank and Wells Fargo, will be responsible for all areas of the company's Internet activities, including: site content, sales, marketing, customer service and financial performance.
Select Comfort currently sells its products through more than 275 company-owned stores, including 13 leased departments within Bed Bath & Beyond stores, through its direct marketing channel and through its events marketing channel. According to Dan McAthie, chief operating officer, "The selectcomfort.com subsidiary is a natural extension of our direct-to-the-consumer business and will further enhance the integration of all our distribution channels. We believe we can attract thousands of consumers to our site through increased internet marketing activities and by offering the consumer the ability to buy directly online." Select Comfort is the country's leading air bed company and the fifth largest mattress manufacturer. Currently, orders placed for Select Comfort products through its retail and direct marketing channels are shipped directly to the customer within 48 hours from one of the company's two plants --in Minnesota and South Carolina. "We already have all the systems in place for a smooth transition to e-commerce," said Christensen.
Select Comfort recently updated its website to provide more detailed information to consumers in preparation to implement e-commerce early in 1999. "We plan to be selling our full line of products online by May 1st," said McAthie.
The initial phase of the company's online strategy is to launch aggressive new marketing programs to reach Internet consumers while capitalizing on Select Comfort's existing retail, database marketing, order fulfillment and customer service infrastructure. Selectcomfort.com's marketing strategies will include targeted banner advertising and affiliate partner programs. The affiliate program is planned to include strategic partners, such as online home furnishing stores and health/wellness websites. Affiliate sites will link to selectcomfort.com, allowing them to earn referral fees for bed purchases originating from the referral site. Affiliate partners are currently being recruited in preparation for the unveiling of Select Comfort's e-commerce capabilities in May. Incremental,
Transformational
Announcements reflecting a firm either moving into a new line of business or adopting a new business method were coded as transformational. Announcements of conventional firms simply establishing online channels were considered incremental to avoid systematic biases between net and click-and-mortar firms
Appendix-3: Details of Kernel Estimation
The CARS observed over the 2-year period were smoothed using the Nadaraya-Watson estimator: (Nadaraya, 1964; Watson, 1964) ( 
where N is the number of observations of y, K is the kernel function and h is the bandwidth parameter.
A common choice of kernel is the epanechnikov kernel:
where I is the indicator function that takes a value of one if |u| ≤ 1 and zero otherwise (Härdle, 1990) . This kernel has an inverted U shape, so that values of x i close to x 0 are weighted more heavily than observations far away. The bandwidth parameter h determines how many observations are used in the average and how peaked the kernel is. When h is chosen to be proportional to N -1/5 the variance and bias converge to zero at the same rate and this results in the integrated squared error converging to zero at its optimal rate (Yatchew, 1998) . In our case, we have two years worth of data and therefore choose h to be 730N -1/5
.
